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Social Remembering and Organizational Memory  
Abstract 
Organizational Memory Studies (OMS) is limited by its managerialist, presentist preoccupation 
with the utility of memory for knowledge management. The dominant model of memory in OMS 
is that of a storage bin. But this model has been rejected by psychologists because it overlooks 
the distinctly human subjective experience of remembering, i.e. episodic memory. OMS also fails 
to take account of the specific social and historical contexts of organizational memory.  The 
methodological individualism that is prevalent in OMS makes it difficult to engage with the 
rapidly expanding sociological and historical literature in social memory studies, where a more 
social constructionist approach to “collective memory” is generally favoured.  However, for its 
part social memory studies derived from Maurice Halbwachs neglects organizations, focusing 
primarily on the nation as a mnemonic community. From a critical perspective organizations can 
be seen as appropriating society’s memory through corporate sites of memory such as historical 
visitor attractions and corporate museums.  There is scope for a sociological and historical 
reorientation within OMS, drawing on social memory studies and focusing on corporate sites of 
memory, such as The Henry Ford museum complex, as well as the mnemonic role of founders 
and beginnings in organizations. Taking a social constructionist, collectivist approach to social 
remembering in organizations allows connections to be made between memory and other 
research programmes, such as organizational culture studies.  
 
Keywords: Organizational Memory; Collective Memory; Organizational History; Social 
Memory Studies. 
8,690 words 
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If an “historic turn” (Clark and Rowlinson 2004) is conceptualized as a reorientation, rather than 
merely a supplement to organization studies (Üsdįken and Kieser, 2004), then it should make the 
field more receptive to the broader humanities and social sciences.  But following Walsh and 
Ungson (1991), organizational memory studies (henceforth OMS) has been limited by 
mechanical models, which treat memory as a storage bin, methodological individualism, and a 
managerialist preoccupation with the functional utility of memory for management decision 
making.  By restricting itself to operationalizing an attenuated psychological typology of 
memory, OMS has cut itself off from the broader field of memory studies, and ‘the explosion of 
interest in … collective memory, cultural memory, and commemoration’ (Bernstein 2004), or 
social remembering (Misztal, 2003), that comes together under the general rubric of “social 
memory studies” (Olick and Robbins 1998: 112; Olick 2008).  Although it should be noted that 
for its part, social memory studies has overlooked the significance of organizations for social 
remembering, focusing instead on the family, ethnicity, and national identity.  
The first part of this paper gives a brief overview of memory studies, outlining the 
generally accepted typology of memory from psychology, and then moving on to social memory 
studies. The second part develops a critical perspective on organizational memory studies (OMS), 
informed by the broader field of memory studies. It is argued that the prevalence of 
methodological individualism leads to a conceptualization of organizational memory as the 
accumulation of individual memories from organization members, which can be described as 
“collected memory”.  By contrast, drawing upon a more collectivist, social constructionist 
perspective from social memory studies, which can properly be described as a “collective 
memory” approach, organizations can be seen as constituting memory through language and 
narratives, embodied in rituals and symbols, such as corporate anniversaries and buildings named 
after founders. The final part of the paper sets out a series of themes to frame the study of social 
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remembering and organizations, exploring the scope for a sociological and historical 
reorientation within OMS, and highlighting the relevance of memory for other fields in 
organization studies, such as organizational culture studies.  
MEMORY STUDIES 
The editors of the new journal, Memory Studies, readily acknowledge that the‘divergence in 
backgrounds and assumptions’ in the study of memory needs to ‘be highlighted and deliberately 
negotiated, not wished away’. They advocate open and careful ‘contesting of concepts’ so as to 
‘exploit the strengths of the daunting range of disciplines’ involved in memory studies (Hoskins 
et al. 2008: 5-6). That diversity of disciplines is illustrated by a recent anthology on memory 
(Wood and Byatt 2008), which includes contributions from neuroscience, experimental 
psychology, and psychoanalysis, as well as sociology, history, literature, and philosophy, notably 
Paul Ricoeur’s Memory, History, Forgetting (2004).   
Taxonomies of Memory 
Typologies of memory continue to proliferate, especially in psychology (Roediger and Wertsch 
2008: 10), but science has established a widely accepted taxonomical distinction between at least 
three classes of memory (Rose 2008: 56). Procedural memory is remembering how to do 
something, such as riding a bicycle.  Declarative, or semantic memory, allows us to remember 
that the object with two wheels is called a bicycle.  Semantic memory contains the conceptual 
and factual knowledge, and procedural knowledge allows us to learn the skills and acquire the 
habits that allow us to carry out activities such as driving a car without any subjective experience 
of remembering the knowledge and skills (Schacter 1997: 17).  
But the typology of declarative, or semantic, and procedural memory excludes those 
characteristics of memory that are distinctly human (McCrone 1999; Schacter 1997; 2001).  As 
Schacter explains: 
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‘there is something special about the subjective experience of explicitly remembering past 
incidents that separates it from other uses of memory, something that is often overlooked 
in scientific analyses that portray memory as a device for storing and retrieving 
information. In order to be experienced as a memory, the retrieved information must be 
recollected in the context of a particular time and place with some reference to oneself as 
a participant in the episode’ (Schacter 1997: 17). 
Following Tulving (1983), this type of memory is referred to as ‘episodic memory’. It 
emphasises the importance of the subjective experience of the person who does the remembering, 
the rememberer, for whom the remembered past is essential for a sense of self (Schacter 1997: 
17, 33-4).  
According to the neurobiologist, Steven Rose, the ‘mechanical model’ in which, 
‘Memories are stored as in computer files’, is inadequate because, ‘Each act of recall is itself a 
new experience’ (2008: 65-66).  The generally accepted view in psychology is therefore that 
experiences are recreated or reconstructed rather than retrieved through memory (Schacter 2001: 
9). The ‘passive warehouse view of memory has been coming under increasing attack’ (McCrone 
2004: 3), and it is argued that ‘what we really mean by memory in humans is recollection’, which 
is predicated upon language (McCrone 1999: 297). Episodic memory is vital for autobiographical 
memory, in which ‘the complex mixtures of personal knowledge that we retain about the past are 
woven together to form life stories and personal myths. These are the biographies of self that 
provide narrative continuity between past and future—a set of memories that form the core of 
personal identity’ (Schacter 1997: 93). Whether an experience is remembered or not depends 
very much on whether it is committed to memory in the form of a story, since, ‘Human beings 
are storytellers, and we tell stories about ourselves. Thinking and talking about experiences not 
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only helps to make sense of the past, but also changes the likelihood of subsequent remembering’ 
(Schacter 2001: 31).  
Social Memory Studies 
As a major contributor to the field acknowledges, the rapidly expanding field of social memory 
studies remains ‘a nonparadigmatic, transdisciplinary, centerless enterprise’ (Olick 1998: 106; 
2008).  Nevertheless, there are several useful surveys of social memory studies in sociology 
(Olick and Robbins 1998; Misztal 2003) and history (Bernstein 2004; Kansteiner 2002), and 
Zerubavel (2003: 10) presents a generalizable analytic framework.  For Misztal the study of 
social memory is ‘primarily concerned with the social aspects of remembering and the results of 
this social experience – that is, the representation of the past in a whole set of ideas, knowledges, 
cultural practices, rituals and monuments through which people express their attitudes to the past 
and which construct their relation to the past’ (Misztal 2003: 6). Zerubavel makes the point that, 
‘Unlike psychology, sociology is particularly attentive to the social context within which we 
access the past, thereby reminding us that we actually remember much of what we do only as 
members of particular communities’ (2003: 3). Zerubavel refers to these as ‘mnemonic 
communities’ (2003: 8), which include organizations, but Misztal refers to ‘the family, the ethnic 
group and the nation’ as if that is an exhaustive list of the mnemonic communities in which 
‘mnemonic socialization’ takes place (2003: 15, 19). 
From the various surveys of social memory studies it is clear that the French sociologist, 
Maurice Halbwachs [1877-1945], is usually credited with introducing the concept of collective 
memory into contemporary usage (Misztal, 2003; Olick 1999: 334; Olick 2008: 24-25; Olick and 
Robbins 1998: 106; Zerubavel, 2003). According to Misztal, Halbwachs’ work was long 
neglected, and ‘the re-emergence of interest in the concept of memory in social sciences was 
triggered by the “commemorative fever” of the 1980s and 1990s” (2003: 2). This is usually 
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associated with national identity, as with Nora’s (Nora et al. 1996; 1997; 1998) vast project on 
French memory. Halbwachs himself dealt with collective memory as manifested in the traditions 
of the family, religious groups, and social classes, but in relation to the latter his observations on 
memory in modern capitalism are brief and speculative, focusing on the ‘corporate spirit’ of 
professions rather than corporate organizations (1992: 139).  There is a similar lacuna concerning 
organizational phenomena in Ricoeur (2004). For example when he states that ‘the primary 
reference of historical memory continues to be the nation’ he qualifies this with a rare recognition 
that ‘between the individual and the nation there are many other groups, in particular, 
professional groups’ (2004: 396). But Ricoeur never seems to consider the influence of capitalist 
corporations, or any other large bureaucratic organizations, in relation to memory.   
As a student of Durkheim, Halbwachs’ concept of collective memory has a distinctly 
sociological orientation, reflected in his bold claim that ‘No memory is possible outside 
frameworks used by people living in society to determine and retrieve their recollections’ (1992: 
43). Or as Ricoeur puts it, ‘to remember, we need others’, and ‘not only is the type of memory we 
possess not derivable in any fashion from experience in the first person singular, in fact the order 
of derivation is the other way around’ (2004: 120). In delimiting the field of social memory 
studies, Olick and Robbins (1998: 109) maintain that ‘Halbwachs developed his concept of 
collective memory not only beyond philosophy but against psychology, though the very idea of a 
social memory appropriates psychological terminology’. Ricoeur places Halbwachs in the 
Durkheimian school which opposed its own ‘a methodological holism’ against methodological 
individualism, and made individual memory problematic, even threatening to dismiss the then 
emerging phenomenology ‘under the more or less infamous label of psychologism’ (2004: 95).   
Social memory studies derived from Halbwachs’ (1992) is therefore partly defined by a 
rejection of ‘an individual-psychological approach to memory’ (Olick & Robbins, 1998: 109).  
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Sociologists such as Olick (1999), and Zerubavel (2002), have formulated a distinctive 
sociological paradigm for the study of social memory that ‘resists the predominant 
methodological individualism in the social sciences’ (Olick 1999: 345).  As a historian 
Kansteiner (2002: 181) is also critical of creeping methodological individualism in collective 
memory studies, and warns against the ‘terminological profusion’ that results from attempting to 
incorporate psychological and neurological terminology.  
Olick (1999) maintains that there are ‘two radically different concepts of culture’ in social 
memory studies, one individualistic, which ‘sees culture as a subjective category of meanings 
contained in people’s minds’, the other collectivist, which ‘sees culture as patterns of publicly 
available symbols objectified in society’ (1999: 336). Olick refers to the individualist approach as 
‘collected memory’, which aggregates individual memories, often collected from interviews, as 
in oral history, or surveys, as in social psychology. According to Olick the ‘individualist 
orientation’ of historians conducting depth interviews is clear when they quote Carl Becker’s 
famous essay, “Everyman his Own Historian”’ (Olick 1999: 338 note 9)—the notion of each 
individual being his or her own historian reveals at least latent individualism. Kansteiner also 
notes that ‘many historians remain uncomfortable with Halbwachs’s determined anti-
individualism’ (2002: 181). As for psychological research, much of it ‘works within a very strict 
independent-dependent variable format, in which the ability to recall is the dependent variable. 
Social contexts thus remain undertheorized’ (Olick 1999: 341).  
Olick’s ‘collectivist’ approach to memory challenges ‘the very idea of an individual 
memory. It is not just that we remember as members of groups, but that we constitute those 
groups and their members simultaneously in the act (thus re-member-ing)’ (Olick 1999: 342).  
The ‘genuinely collective nature of remembering’ is demonstrated by ‘the degree to which it 
takes place in and through language, narrative, and dialogue’ (Olick 1999: 343). Kansteiner notes 
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that in the conceptually more interesting studies by historians, the term “cultural memory” is 
preferred instead of collective memory, ‘in order to maintain and further develop Halbwachs’s 
emphasis on the materiality of memory’ (2002: 182). Cultural memory ‘consists of objectified 
culture, that is, the texts, rites, images, buildings, and monuments which are designed to recall 
fateful events in the history of the collective. As the officially sanctioned heritage of a society, 
they are intended for the longue durée’ (Kansteiner 2002: 182). The collectivist approaches to 
social memory from historians and sociologists therefore stand as a challenge to the notion that 
collective memory in organizations can be studied as the accumulation of individual memories 
within a particular organization, detached from the organization’s social and historical context. 
The distinction between “collected memory” and “collective memory” (Kansteiner 2002: 186) 
provides a framework for reviewing memory studies, including OMS. 
In addition to highlighting the problematic relationship between individual memory and 
collective memory, Halbwachs also outlined ‘The Ultimate Opposition Between Collective 
Memory and History’ (1980[1950]: 78; Ricoeur 2004: 393). Olick and Robbins maintain that 
Halbwachs was decisive about the boundary between history and memory: ‘History is dead 
memory, a way of preserving pasts to which we no longer have an “organic” experiential 
relation’ (Olick and Robbins 1998: 110). Zerubavel makes the point that the study of collective 
memory is less about 'what actually happened in history' and more about 'how we remember it' 
(Zerubavel, 2003: 2).  It is clear that collective memory is not the same thing as history 
(Kansteiner 2002: 180), but historians have become increasingly concerned with “the history of 
memory” (Olick and Robbins 1998: 107).     
Social memory studies has appropriated the work of historians as part of its lineage, in 
particular Hobsbawm and Ranger’s (1983) The Invention of Tradition, and Lowenthal’s (1985) 
The Past is a Foreign Country, (Olick & Robbins, 1998: 125; Olick 2008). Lowenthal (1985: 
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200-14) elaborates a distinction between history and memory. He emphasises that memory is not 
a repository of knowledge about past events. Instead it consists of recollections of past events that 
express feelings about those events which cannot be gainsaid. As Lowenthal puts it, ‘a false 
recollection firmly believed becomes a fact in its own right’ (1985: 200). This means that there is 
necessarily a tension between memory and history, since history consists of a dialogue in which 
the past is continually, and deliberately, reinterpreted. Through an interpretation of documentary 
sources, an historian can contradict the past experience that is remembered, which may be 
discomfiting.  
ORGANIZATIONAL MEMORY STUDIES (OMS) 
Walsh and Ungson’s (1991) ‘review of the literature provided the first integrative framework for 
thinking about organizational memory’ (Olivera, 2000: 813), and their systematic exposition 
established OMS as a distinct sub-field.  According to Walsh and Ungson’s definition, 
‘organizational memory refers to stored information from an organization’s history that can be 
brought to bear on present decisions’ (1991: 61). They elaborate a model of organizational 
memory whereby information is acquired and then retained in ‘five storage bins or retention 
facilities that compose the structure of memory within organizations’ (1991: 63). These storage 
bins consist of, individuals, culture, transformations, structures, and ecology. In addition, there 
are external archives that can be consulted, since ‘the organization itself is not the sole repository 
of its past’ (Walsh and Ungson, 1991: 66). 
Walsh and Ungson’s concept of organizational memory has been subject to several 
critiques, with alternative frameworks suggested for understanding memory in organizations. But 
the critiques are fragmented, and the alternative frameworks are eclectic (Casey 1997; Feldman 
and Feldman 2006; Schatzki 2006).  An indication of this fragmentation is that each of the critics 
cites an almost completely different set of references. The only significant authors cited by both 
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Feldman and Feldman (2006) as well as Nissley and Casey (2002) are Halbwachs (various), 
Huber (1991), Moorman and Miner (1998), Walsh and Ungson (1991) and, significantly, Weick 
(various). Schatzki’s (2006) idiosyncratic and philosophically inclined article has only six 
references, and the only citation in common with other critics is Halbwachs.  Both Nissley and 
Casey (2002), and Feldman and Feldman invoke a ‘sociological perspective on organizational 
remembering’ (2006: 872), but neither of them goes much beyond a brief discussion of 
Halbwachs. Walsh and Ungson make a passing reference to Halbwachs, to support their 
contention that information ‘is housed in this supraindividual collectivity’ i.e. the organizational 
culture (1991: 65).  Many other contributions to OMS do not even cite Halbwachs (e.g. Anand et 
al. 1998; Cohen and Bacdayan 1994; de Holan and Phillips 2004; Kyriakopoulos and de Ruyter 
2004; Moorman and Miner 1998; Olivera 2000), which is symptomatic of their separation from 
social memory studies. 
Models of Memory in OMS 
Nissley and Casey (2002: 37) characterize Walsh and Ungson’s (1991) image of organizational 
memory as that of a ‘static repository’. The storage imagery reflects Walsh and Ungson’s 
managerialist preoccupation with the ‘utility’ of information retrieved from organizational 
memory for ‘organizational outcomes and performance’ (1991: 62). Walsh and Ungson claim to 
have borrowed their ‘storage metaphor from individual-level memory processes’ (Walsh and 
Ungson 1991: 63), although it appears to be supported by just one citation from the psychology 
field (Cowan, 1988, cited by Walsh and Ungson 1991: 63). Nevertheless, Walsh and Ungson’s 
repository image, or storage bin model is largely accepted in mainstream OMS (e.g. Anand et al 
1998: 796; Cohen and Bacdayan 1994: 563; Kyriakopoulos and de Ruyter 2004; Moorman and 
Miner 1998). The repository image of memory is also predominant in the extensive information 
systems literature on organizational memory (e.g. Hackbarth and Grover 1999), as well as the 
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emerging research programme on organizational forgetting which takes it as given that 
‘organizational knowledge is stored in organizational memory’ (de Holan and Phillips 2004: 
1605).  
 Nissley and Casey (2002: 44) ‘broadly posit that organizational memory may be 
politicized’, and ‘that the static repository model where some objectified truth is stored may be 
contested’. They use the example of corporate museums to illustrate the way in which 
organizations can choose to ‘selectively remember or forget’, and that, ‘What is remembered or 
what is forgotten shapes an organization’s identity and image’ (Nissley and Casey 2002: 44).  
Incidentally, for the most part OMS makes no connection with organizational identity, and the 
organizational identity literature does not deal with memory (c.f. Hatch 2004).  Nissley and 
Casey’s alternative to the storage bin model is to frame organizational memory ‘as a dynamic, 
socially constructed phenomenon or as a process’ (2002: 37).  Instead of limiting themselves to 
psychology and organization theory, as in most of OMS, Nissley and Casey also draw upon 
history, museum studies, and sociology (2002: 37). However, their analysis remains within the 
‘paradigmatic lens of organizational memory’, with corporate museums ‘framed as sites of 
organizational memory’, and ‘examined as strategic assets used to shape the identity and image 
of the organization’ (2002: 35). But as Feldman and Feldman (2006: 863) argue, a critical 
perspective calls for a more resounding rejection of the ‘problem-focused and strategy-driven’ 
agenda of OMS.  
Walsh and Ungson acknowledge that ‘the proposition that organizations have memories 
raises questions about anthropomorphism’, because ‘it is unclear whether or not information-
processing ideas that are derived primarily from work on biological organisms can be extended to 
social and organizational phenomena’ (1991: 59). As a result, they are compelled to qualify their 
‘most basic assumption … that organizations functionally resemble information-processing 
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systems that process information from the environment’. Their second assumption is that 
organizations are ‘interpretative systems’, and their third assumption is that ‘an organization is a 
network of intersubjectively shared meanings that are sustained through the development and use 
of a common language and everyday social interactions’ (Walsh and Ungson 1991: 60).  
Arguably, Walsh and Ungson’s acknowledgement that organizations are interpretative systems 
and networks of intersubjectively shared meanings, as well as information-processing systems, 
represents an attempt to dilute the repository image of organizational memory. But this is by no 
means made explicit. 
Overall Walsh and Ungson retain a functional managerialist view of organizational 
memory as a process of information retrieval that can aid decision making, rather than asking 
about the meaning of memory for organization members. As a result Walsh and Ungson remain 
locked into a view of organizations focused on the needs of the moment. They do not recognize 
that recollection, or imaginative reconstruction of the past, represents much more than merely a 
functional aid for decision making in the present.  The problem, therefore, with the generally 
accepted concept of organizational memory, is not so much that it anthropomorphically attributes 
a human personality to organizations, but that it neglects the specifically human characteristics of 
memory.  
Walsh and Ungson (1991) concentrate on formulating a typology of the storage bins in 
which organizational memory is stored, rather than a typology of the forms of memory that are 
stored.  However, following Cohen and Bacdayan (1994) the psychological concepts of 
procedural and declarative memory have been operationalized in OMS (Moorman and Miner 
1998; Kyriakopoulos and de Ruyter 2004). Cohen and Bacdayen (1994: 557) focus on procedural 
memory, and their experimental research supports their proposition that this form of memory 
stores the memory of organizational routines. They relegate their limited discussion of 
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‘contending taxonomies’, such as ‘“implicit/explicit,” “skill memory/fact memory” and 
“semantic/episodic”’ to an endnote (1994: 567 note 1). Moorman and Miner (1999), followed by 
Kyriakopoulos and de Ruyter (2004), do not even acknowledge any alternatives or additions to 
the procedural and declarative typology of memory.  Revealingly, in an endnote Kyriakopoulos 
and de Ruyter declare that they ‘use the terms knowledge stocks and organizational memory 
interchangeably’ (2004: 1493), as if it is unproblematic to equate knowledge and memory.   
As Ricoeur (2004: 23-25) explains, remembering only coincides with knowing at the level 
of habit or memorization, which is ‘incorporated into the living present, unmarked, unremarked 
as past’.  In a brief discussion of what he calls ‘the zone of technical activities’, techniques, and 
technical rules, Halbwachs poses the question: ‘Is this something that can be called a collective 
memory? … 
‘those who apply these rules are directed toward present actions and attempt to understand 
how they work rather than to know their origins or to recall their history. They very often 
operate almost mechanically, like those habits that, after appearing in an organism can no 
longer be distinguished from instinctive acts’ (1992: 160). 
Mainstream OMS can therefore be seen as restricted by a presentist, managerialist preoccupation 
with knowledge management and organizational learning that is only concerned with the 
retention of useful knowledge, and the forgetting of redundant knowledge, within an individual 
organization.  Feldman and Feldman (2006: 864) allege that within OMS there is a phobia 
towards any sense of the consciously remembered past—the human capacity for recollection is in 
effect dismissed as redundant in OMS unless it enhances organizational performance. Even when 
OMS focuses on storytelling, as in ethnographic research, it is reduced to a functional role as a 
carrier of tacit knowledge (e.g. Orr 1990). 
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Within mainstream OMS it is conceded that, ‘Although organizations do not “remember” 
in the true sense of the word, organizational (or group) memory is a convenient metaphor that can 
be used to define the information and knowledge known by the organization and the processes by 
which such information is acquired, stored, and retrieved by organization members’ (Anand et al. 
1998: 796). This suggests that OMS is not about remembering at all. The neglect of episodic 
memory and the subjective experience of remembering, let alone the sociological concept of 
collective memory, means that OMS presents an impoverished image of memory in 
organizations.   
Nissley and Casey attempt to integrate the sociological concept of collective memory into 
OMS. They refer to the sociology of memory ‘as a socially constructed process (collective 
memory)’ in order to support their proposition that ‘Corporate museums are forms of socially 
constructed semantic (history) and episodic (cultural) collective memory’ (Nissley and Casey, 
2002: 38-40). Following Casey’s (1997: 122) earlier work on collective memory in organizations, 
they propose that organizational and collective memory, are ‘structured by episodic and semantic 
memory’ (Nissley and Casey 2002: 37). They define semantic memory as ‘shared interpretations 
of significant events that were not personally experienced, compared with episodic memory, 
which is shared interpretations of personally experienced events’ (2002: 38). They then define 
museums as a form of episodic memory. But this idiosyncratic terminological hodgepodge not 
only departs from the commonly accepted psychological definitions of semantic and episodic 
memory, it also conflates those psychological terms with the sociological concept of collective 
memory, going against the warnings from social memory studies not to try to integrate collective 
memory with psychological concepts of memory (Kansteiner 2002).   
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Methodology in OMS 
OMS is not marked by a preoccupation with methodology, and most authors do not explicitly 
locate themselves epistemologically or ontologically. Nissley and Casey (2002) point to the 
cultural and political aspects of organizational memory, but despite their critique of the storage 
bin model they do not break from the dominant paradigm in OMS (Nissley and Casey, 2002: 35). 
Feldman and Feldman (2006) suggest that epistemologically such a break would entail a critique 
of the predominant positivism, and ontologically a fuller elaboration of a social constructionist 
stance as an alternative to the underlying methodological individualism in OMS.  They contend 
that the ‘underlying paradigm’ of OMS ‘adopts an empiricist, objectivist, and mechanistic 
perspective’ (Feldman and Feldman 2006: 868).  
From Walsh and Ungson (1991) onwards, OMS is characterized by testable propositions 
and research strategies to provide systematic falsification or verification, with an obsessive 
formalizing of measurable relationships between different types of memory and other variables, 
such as information flows and financial performance (Moorman and Miner 1998) which can then 
be incorporated into detailed structured questionnaires (Kyriakopoulos and de Ruyter 2004). 
Cohen and Bacdayen (1994) come closest to experimental methods in psychological research on 
memory (c.f. Schacter 2001). They conducted a laboratory experiment consisting of a card game 
with two players who could ‘be seen as miniature organizations with behavior patterns that are 
organizational routines’ (1994: 559). At the more interpretive end of the spectrum in OMS, 
Olivera (2000) manages to do without propositions or hypotheses for examining how 
organization members access memory of experiential knowledge. Olivera’s research consists of 
observation and 74 interviews in a consulting firm, from which he selects nineteen illustrative 
quotes (2000: 818-25).  
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Of the critics, Casey (1997) and Nissley and Casey (2002) are notable for having carried 
out empirical case studies.  Nissley and Casey start from the proposition that, ‘Corporate 
museums function as a form of organizational memory’ (2002: 37). Casey’s work is important 
because it is part of an ongoing engagement with sociological models in relation to organizational 
memory and organizational learning (Casey 2005).  Casey’s (1997) earlier case study of the 
creation of collective memory in an organization largely relies on structured interviews, 
triangulated with observation and analysis of documents, from which she identifies the stories 
that were shared by organization members, such as those concerning its founding. She defines 
collective memory as ‘shared interpretations of the past as related by members of an 
organization’ (1997: 116). One of her assumptions is ‘that collective memory is at least partially 
housed in individuals who can describe experiences which represent this memory. The data in 
this study is driven by collectives of individuals, events they described, brochures they wrote or 
remembered, behavior that was observed, and recollections of actions that were taken’ (Casey 
1997: 138).   
Casey’s reliance on interviews to reconstruct and interpret organization members’ 
memories, as in organizational culture studies (Martin et al. 1985), reduces memory in 
organizations to the accumulation of accounts from individuals (Zerubavel 2003: 2). Although 
Casey (1997; Nissley and Casey 2002) introduces the sociological concept of collective memory 
into OMS, it is clear that she retains a version of the concept that is ‘based on individualistic 
principles: the aggregated individual memories of members of a group’ (Olick 1999: 338).  Casey 
therefore remains within a methodologically individualist framework of “collected memory”, 
rather than “collective memory” (Kansteiner 2002: 186). 
There are extensive and approving citations to Weick in OMS (e.g. Anand et al. 1998; 
Casey 1997; Cohen and Bacdayan, 1994; Moorman and Miner, 1998; Nissley and Casey, 2002; 
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Olivera, 2000; Walsh and Ungson 1991), and Weick (1995: 38) also cites Walsh and Ungson 
(1991) approvingly for their ‘social’ definition of an organization. But arguably there is an 
underlying methodological individualism in Weick’s work which is reflected in OMS.  For 
Weick (2001: 111) the social construction of reality is the outcome of intersubjective 
communication, it is an achievement that is ‘next to impossible’ in certain circumstances, such as 
the chaos of a fire. What Weick means by the social construction of reality is clearly at odds with 
the sociological meaning of the term (Berger and Luckmann 1966). For Weick the social 
construction of reality is a hypothetical achievement, whereas the sociological concept takes 
socially constructed reality as a categorical given, for example in the language available to actors 
in the chaos of a fire, or the day of the week.  In relation to memory Weick’s methodological 
individualism is apparent from his wry contention that ‘Every Manager [is] a Historian’, and ‘any 
decision maker is only as good as his or her memory. And memory, in turn, is no better that the 
detail that is encoded in it’ (1995: 184-185), which also conflates history and memory. Within 
OMS therefore, even critics such as Nissley and Casey (2002) do not acknowledge the 
contradiction between Halbwachs’s resolute anti-individualism and the latent methodological 
individualism derived from Weick. 
OMS has also excluded any serious engagement with history, historiography, or the 
theory and philosophy of history. Walsh and Ungson retain a naïve realist view of history, 
reflected in their concern with the ‘problem of inaccuracy’, whereby ‘a culture may carry an 
interpretation of why a decision was made but this received wisdom from the past may or may 
not be accurate’ (Walsh and Ungson 1991: 68). But in organizational culture studies the 
possibility of constructing an accurate account of the past is viewed with scepticism, as Martin et 
al. explain: 
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Far from being objective descriptions, accounts of key events in an organization’s history 
reflect differential attention, selective perception, and incomplete recall. As organizational 
members arrive at mutually acceptable interpretations of events, distortions and omissions 
multiply. By the time accounts have ossified in the form of organizational stories, legends 
and sagas, a new reality has been socially constructed (1985: 103).  
Weick makes a similar point: 
‘Accurate perceptions have the power to immobilize.…  Bold action is adaptive because 
its opposite, deliberation, is futile in a changing world where perceptions, by definition, 
can never be accurate. They can never be accurate because, by the time people notice and 
name something, it has become something else and no longer exists’ (Weick 1995: 60). 
Here again there is an unacknowledged contradiction between Walsh and Ungson’s (1991) 
insistence on the need for accurate accounts of the past to be retained in the storage bins of 
organizational memory ready for future decision making, and Weick’s (1995: 61) belief that ‘an 
obsession with accuracy seems fruitless, and not of much practical help, either. Of much more 
help are the symbolic trappings of sensemaking, trappings such as myths, metaphors, platitudes, 
fables, epics, and paradigms’. 
As Feldman and Feldman observe, ‘For Walsh and Ungson (1991) history is primarily a 
frame that is consciously imposed by top management’ (2006: 868). A critic of OMS from 
heritage studies makes the point that the repository model often strips “memory” of ‘any 
historical context, or, indeed, of much meaning: other, that is, than in a normative way that 
suggests organisations might lose something of possible future use to them if they do not 
maintain an archival memory’ (Gough 2004: 444).  
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SOCIAL REMEMBERING AND ORGANIZATIONS 
Turning back to social memory studies, there is no good reason for the neglect of organizations. 
It is axiomatic in organization theory, and especially critical management studies, that we live in 
a “society of organizations” in which large bureaucratic organizations have absorbed society 
(Perrow 1991), constituting ‘societies in themselves, providing, on their own terms, the cradle-to-
grave services that communities and small organizations used to provide’ (Perrow 2002). It 
would be remarkable if collective memory were exempt from this process of absorption, but 
OMS is more or less indifferent to the wider social context of organizations, and social memory 
studies has overlooked the significance of corporate organizations for collective memory. 
Corporate Sites of Memory 
According to Zerubavel, the “sites” of social memory, ‘as well as some useful means of studying 
it’, can be constituted by:  
Libraries, bibliographies, folk legends, photo albums, and television archives … history 
textbooks, calendars, eulogies, guest books, tombstones, war memorials, and various 
Halls of Fame. Equally evocative in this regard are pageants, commemorative parades, 
anniversaries, and various public exhibits of archaeological and other historical objects 
(Zerubvavel 2003: 6).  
Many of these phenomena have organizational manifestations. The past is remembered by 
organizations in a range of publicly available organizational documents, such as annual reports, 
press releases, company webpages, company magazines, telephone and trade directories, and 
commissioned company histories, as well as events such as corporate centenary celebrations, and 
artefacts, such as commemorative products and memorabilia, décor, and buildings.  
Corporate organizations appropriate society’s memory in a variety of ways, one of which 
is through sites of memory, such as visitor attractions offering ‘brand experiences’ (Rowlinson 
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2002), and ‘corporate commemoration’ of national events (Gough 2004: 440). In the general 
critique of McDonaldization (Ritzer 1996) and Disneyfication (Walsh 1992: 4, 64) it is hardly 
surprising that Disney World has been denounced for presenting ‘Mickey Mouse history’ 
(Wallace 1989). But Disney does not insert its own corporate past into its representation of the 
American past in the same way that corporate museums do.  
Nissley and Casey (2002) have highlighted the significance of corporate museums. They 
discuss several corporate museums, such as Hershey Foods Corporation’s “Chocolate World”, 
and the Bass Museum in the UK, ‘known as Britain’s “national brewing museum”’ (2002: 40), 
but focus on Hormel Corporation’s SPAM Museum in Austin, Minnesota, USA. However, their 
research is marred by the flaws in their approach to memory as “collected”, as opposed to 
“collective”. The “collected memory” approach is better suited to interviews and ethnography 
(e.g. Casey 1997), and Nissley and Casey (2002) offer little or no explanation of their methods 
for studying corporate museums. For a start it is by no means even clear whether or when they 
visited the SPAM museum to make observations, or if they merely obtained brochures, although 
no references are given for the brochures that are quoted.  
They note that: 
In the SPAM Museum, a singly storyline is remembered – “management” tells it and it 
focuses on “production” and “efficiency”. However, labourers and labour activists, 
outside of the museum, are remembering and telling another story (e.g. … Rachleff, 1992; 
Schleuning, 1994) – one that is not part of the “sanctioned” organizational memory. This 
story focuses on “labour solidarity” and “mistreatment”, not “production” and 
“efficiency” (2002: 42).  
But this is too coy. The 1985-86 strike by 1,500 union members against the meatpacking giant, 
Hormel, was one of the bitterest disputes of the 1980s. Most labour historians would be familiar 
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with it, but the details require elaboration in relation to OMS. Despite citing the major accounts 
of the conflict Nissley and Casey (2002) fail to analyze the strike in relation to the SPAM 
Museum, and this is symptomatic of the inability of OMS to deal with organizational memory in 
its social and historical context.    
Barndt’s (2007) account of The Henry Ford museum complex in Dearborn, Michigan, 
close to Ford’s car factory, and Rowlinson’s (2002) account of Cadbury World in Birmingham, 
on the same site as Cadbury’s main chocolate manufacturing facility in Britain, provide a 
revealing contrast to Nissley and Casey (2002). Both Barndt and Rowlinson give detailed 
historical accounts of how The Henry Ford and Cadbury World came into existence. They 
combine detailed observation with clear citation to sources, as is obligatory in historical journals. 
Following Lowenthal (1985), Rowlinson considers Cadbury World in terms of the ‘conflict 
between corporate heritage and the representation of history’ (2002: 102), focusing on the failure 
of Cadbury World to mention the issue of slavery on the plantations that supplied Cadbury’s 
cocoa in the early 20th century. Barndt sees The Henry Ford as continuing the process of 
‘domesticating the past as a marketable commodity’ (2007: 384) that Lowenthal (1985) 
identified.  
Neither Barndt (2007) nor Rowlinson (2002; Rowlinson and Hassard 1993) locate their 
work within OMS, but in line with the extensive editorial “relabelling” in memory studies 
(Kansteiner 2002: 182), both can be claimed as examples of OMS that focus on “collective 
memory” rather than “collected memory”, and therefore emphasize the social and historical 
context of corporate museums.  Similarly Gough’s account of war memorials at Lloyds TSB 
finance group in the UK can be seen as an extension of OMS in heritage studies. Gough links the 
commemoration of war dead, an important theme in social memory studies, with the recognition 
 22
by financial corporations in the early 21st century that the “corporate past”, including 
‘monumental furniture’, is an asset ‘to be preserved and promoted’ (Gough 2004: 447).  
Founders and Beginnings 
Zerubavel makes the case that, ‘The social commemoration of “origins” is not confined in any 
way to nations or religious communities and is just as evident in the various anniversaries 
through which cities, colleges, and companies celebrate the historic moments when they were 
founded’ (Zerubavel, 2003: 102). By extending the conceptualization of OMS beyond the storage 
bin model of knowledge management, previous research in organization studies on the founders 
and beginnings of organizations can be relabelled as relevant for memory studies. For example, 
Martin et al.’s (1985) ‘critical view’ of the ‘seductive promise’ made to entrepreneurs: 
namely that a founder can create a culture, cast in the founder’s own image and reflecting 
the founder’s own values, priorities, and vision of the future. Thus a founder’s personal 
perspective can be transformed into a shared legacy that will survive death or departure 
… a personal form of organizational immortality (Martin et al. 1985: 99). 
 Martin et al. maintain that the credit given to founders may be misplaced. They explain 
the overestimation of a founder’s impact in terms of two social cognition biases. First, salience, 
which means that founders figure more prominently than other organization members, and 
second, attribution, which means that success is more likely to be attributed to founders. Martin 
et al.’s (1985) qualitative research consisted of interviews and observation in a single 
organization. In a later re-examination, Martin (2002: 259) outlines how the ‘study begins by 
collecting and aggregating interpretations and then proceeds to reify those aggregations, as if they 
were objectively accurate characterizations of this organization’s culture and subcultures’. In 
other words, Martin et al. (1985) could be characterized as conducting a study of “collected 
memory” that treats organizational memory as an aggregate of individual memories and explains 
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it in terms of social psychological concepts, similar to Casey’s (1997) research in OMS.  An 
alternative “collective memory” approach to the cultural legacy of founders might start with 
publicly available ideological discourses, such as ‘highly schematic “rags-to-riches” biographical 
narratives’ (Zerubavel 2003: 14).     
 Zerubavel (1993: 458) consciously reverses the assumption that cultures in the present 
can be explained by reference to the past, instead he maintains that: ‘As our present social 
situation changes, so does our perception of our common past. Examining the way groups 
construct their beginnings is therefore indispensable to any study of the development of collective 
identity’. According to Zerubavel (2003: 8), ‘the social construction of beginnings’ by nations, 
organizations, and ethnic groups, includes ‘the common mnemonic effort to enhance one’s 
legitimacy by exaggerating one’s antiquity’ (Zerubavel, 2003: 8).  Hobsbawm (Hobsbawm and 
Ranger 1983: 1) also notes that, ‘”Traditions” which appear or claim to be old are often quite 
recent in origin and sometimes invented’. Hobsbawm and Ranger are almost exclusively 
concerned with national traditions, but the corporate consultant, Wally Olins, recognized the 
importance of invented tradition for an organization, which ‘must celebrate what it is and what it 
stands for through rituals and ceremonies. … Museums, company history, buildings in the 
corporate style, work-clothes, major events based around anniversaries, or product launches have 
to be a significant part of the rhythm of corporate life’ (Olins 1989: 25).  
The social practices for remembering the past in organizations can be termed 
“organizational mnemonics”. The annual report represents a mnemonic opportunity for an 
organization to remind various interested parties of its past. GE’s Annual Report for 2001 
illustrates how a successful company can invoke the past to bolster confidence in the future. One 
of Jack Welch’s maxims is ‘Forget the Past; Love the Future’ (Crainer, 2002). But when Welch 
retired from GE in 2001, after 21 years as Chairman, he was not forgotten. In the Annual Report 
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Welch’s successor, Jeff Immelt, described Welch as ‘first and foremost, a teacher.  In that vein 
we renamed our management institute at Crotonville the “John F. Welch Learning Center.”’  
According to Immelt, the centre at Crotonville is, ‘one of the cornerstones of our culture and one 
of the institutions that makes GE work. Generations of GE leaders and customers will have the 
opportunity to benefit from Jack’s vision and commitment. What a fitting tribute’. The Annual 
Report can be interpreted as part of the institutionalisation of Jack Welch’s ‘legend’ in such a 
way that the counterlegend is likely to be seen as heretical at GE (Hegele and Kieser 2001).  
Immelt, or presumably one of his PR team, came up with the phrase: ‘GE has always been about 
the future’, which typifies the lexicon of future-oriented allusions to the past in annual reports. In 
conclusion Immelt again alludes to history: ‘GE is a 124-year old large, multibusiness company 
that is bound together by common systems of people development, initiatives, financial 
management and controllership -- and values’.  The reminders of the organization’s age, and the 
naming of the John F. Welch Learning Center, constitute the annual report and the management 
institute as sites of memory, or organizational mnemonics.  
CONCLUSIONS 
If OMS were to undergo an historical reorientation (Üsdįken and Kieser, 2004) then it would be 
more open to social memory studies and an understanding of organizational memory in its social 
and historical context. This would set a new agenda for OMS. For example, the rise of social 
memory studies is in part attributable to the increasing commemoration of the Holocaust 
(Bernstein 2004). One manifestation of this is that German companies have increasingly turned to 
reputable academic historians to provide ‘independent’ reviews of their conduct during the Third 
Reich (e.g. Friedländer et al 2002). But while commissioned historians examine what actually 
happened up until 1945, they are less concerned with how this period has been remembered by 
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companies subsequently, and how organizations deal with revelations of the darker side to their 
history (Booth et al. 2007).   
Compared to, say, organizational culture studies, OMS is at an early stage of 
development. This paper has made a start at ‘mapping the terrain’ (Martin 2002) in OMS, by 
exploring the differences between “collected memory” and “collective memory”, and bringing 
social memory studies into a critical perspective on mainstream managerialist OMS. Social 
memory studies represent a critique of social theory for its lack of ‘a direct and coherent answer 
to the questions about how societies remember and why the past is of any relevance’ (Misztal 
2003: 5). The same critique applies to OMS for failing to appreciate that the past in an 
organization is ‘not just like a database’ (Fridenson 2008: 23), and it is not only remembered for 
instrumental reasons, to provide lessons for improving present organizational performance. 
Instead it is vital for our sense of identity. In Ricoeur’s terms, OMS, and organization studies in 
general, fails to appreciate our “historical condition”, in which, ‘We make history, and we make 
histories, because we are historical’ (2004: 284).  Of course, organizations will continue to ‘make 
histories’, or else others will make their histories for them, recalling their past through mnemonic 
practices, naming buildings after prominent organization members, choosing names to give an 
aura of age, regularly recording the year of their establishment in annual reports and entries in 
trade directories, commissioning monumental corporate histories by conservative academics to 
commemorate their centenaries (Delahaye et al 2009), and so on, whether they are noticed in 
organization studies or not.  
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